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**The Smokey Mountain Housing Project: Observations of infrastructural projects in
Metro Manila, and implicit discriminatory housing avenues**

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Abstract

This research and analysis explore efforts to provide low-cost housing and develop infrastructure for scavenging and homeless populations in the National Capital Region of the Philippines, with particular focus on the Smokey Mountain Housing Project as a joint venture between the National Housing Authority and the private developer, R-II Builders' Inc. This paper delves into discriminatory practices in low-cost housing for larger households, especially for families possessing younger or elderly members. Households in these projects are unable to compete economically and survive short-term costs. Therefore, they continue to exist within scavenger areas, such as the Payatas Dumpsite, even after the 1995 closure of the Smokey Mountain site. Through analysis and observation concerning infrastructure, governance, and housing discrimination capacity within the Philippines, as well as the socio-economic environments of both Tondo and the Payatas, this paper builds on the observation that the Smokey Mountain housing project inadequately provides for larger households and younger members, as scavenger populations prefer to continue short-term, immediate slum housing rather than suffer the costs of long-term garnered profit, i.e., separated, private housing.

Background

Smokey Mountain was the popularized name for a large landfill in Manila. The Smokey Mountain decomposing waste site hosted many scavengers dependent on the refuse for their shelter and livelihoods becoming a testament to the wealth disparity in the urban center. Over more than fifty years, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders Inc. worked on public housing projects and urban resettlement to deal with this endemic issue.¹ However, when the area was closed in 1995, those depending on the site moved to the Payatas dumpsite instead

of entering public housing. They continued the scavenger lifestyle that the government had been trying to remove from the National Capital Region. This phenomenon reflects the more considerable discussion of the efficiency of the NHA and central government, the corruption in funding for public works, and the accessibility and attitudes towards poverty in the Philippines. These projects resulted in the inability of scavenger populations to remain in transit and find solutions providing economic relief. The origins of this project and its development embody the ties between public housing limitations and mounting levels of privatization that have impacted the Metro-Manila area over the past three decades.

The original project began in 1992 as the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), with the Aquino administration approving the National Housing Authority of the Philippines, a subsidiary of the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development. This project's purpose was to approve the removal of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite to develop a coastal community to allow for a revitalization of economic development and health. The SMDRP was initially organized as a deal between the NHA and a private company, R-II Builders Inc, which was structured to receive private ownership of public land to help cover associated expenses and protect the Philippines-based company from foreign competition. However, the project's budgetary constraints led to increased distribution of public land into the hands of the private company, with over two hundred hectares of land allocated to R-II Builders Inc. to the company to avoid going over the NHA budget.²

However, two years after the project began, the R-II company ran low on funds due to inefficiency and ill-preparation. Further, the mounting Asian Financial crisis, drained economic activity and government expenditures. The project was sustained by entering into an asset pool arrangement which bankrolled until its eventual completion in 2001. The dumpsite was

bulldozed entirely, and the remaining residents were relocated to temporary housing environments. The residents were then organized to receive more permanent placement within the low-cost housing structure.³

First, this section analyzes the NHA and its administrative structure during the project's time. The NHA was founded in the 1970s and its administrative work on the Smokey Mountain Project was split between two executive agents: Angelo F. Laynes and Raymundo R. Dizon Jr. During their time with the agency, the two witnessed the project's execution, with the intent of entering a sponsored agreement with private corporate entities to attain a restructured image of the labor in Tondo.⁴ The practice of linking private entities with government projects is rooted in infrastructural issues with the NHA's inadequate handling of larger projects, especially within the Metro-Manila area. According to the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) research, government projects within the Metro area often struggle to complete projects due to a lack of accountable rehousing. In contrast, successful programs see more success via private developer partnerships.⁵ One of the most significant resettlement projects in the nation, known as the Completed Housing Project, mainly comprises private partnership contracts, representing approximately seventy percent of the completed work.

Additionally, projects within urban centers are much more expensive. With limitations on housing capacity, socialized housing opportunities within Metro Manila demonstrate a dysfunctional environment proliferated by privatized housing costs. Given that most NHA funds go towards work within the Greater Manila Area (GMA), the issue with delayed or failing projects could be attributed to a lack of supply for construction goods and human labor for high-cost projects or improper utilization of supplies. Coupled with the heavy alignment towards privatized industry, this may be indicative of the capability of the NHA to properly oversee

housing and resettlement projects, such as the SMDRP. Figure 1 is a chart from the PIDS displaying the yearly distribution of project costs and showcasing the larger distribution made towards the GMA. Figure 1 reflects the patterns we anticipate seeing during the life of the SMDRP.⁶

Figure 1: PIDS chart on Public Housing Project Spending in the Philippines

Item	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2007-2011	
	GMA	Regions	GMA	Regions	GMA	Regions	GMA	Regions	GMA	Regions	GMA	Regions
Project Development (including Housing Support)	95%	5%	97%	3%	95%	5%	96%	4%	86%	14%	94%	6%
Land Acquisition/Assembly	52%	48%	87%	13%	93%	7%	100%	0%	100%	0%	74%	26%
Other Project Related Capital Outlay	-	-	-	-	-	-	41%	59%	86%	14%	77%	23%
Total (Project Related)	94%	6%	97%	3%	95%	5%	95%	5%	86%	14%	93%	7%

Source: NHA Corporate Operating Budget
Notes:

Exploring the private entities partnering with the NHA, like the R-II Builders, Inc., this research can derive a brief outlook of how interwoven the NHA is with the private sector for public sector projects. The R-II Builders was licensed and registered in 1988, under the Philippines Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a general contractor, working on construction in housing, hospitals, and stadiums, with a particular focus on certification and capacity towards reclamation and engineering displayed in the Tondo housing project. Their work is also featured in other NHA collaborations, such as the Sugartowne Housing Project, a Joint Venture Program delivering housing units via resource and expertise sharing mechanisms through private governance.

Initialized in 1999, only a few years after the initial development of the Tondo project, the Sugartowne Housing project was assigned a Steering Committee for project implementation, which would oversee and manage. This committee shared joint authority between an NHA representative, the local Sugar Regulatory Administration under Wilson S. Gamboa, and R-II Builders, Inc. president Edmond Q. See. This relationship displays the company’s level of influence and authority in the affairs of government housing projects.⁷ Projects oriented around

community development (specifically resettlement and reclamation) require incentives for private entities through monetary exchange and funding for their work. When looking at both the ownership of land (as what occurred in the Tondo project) and an over-extended budget resulting in debts for the work completed, one is left to consider the amount of private pressure for creating a profitable future environment.

The Smokey Mountain landfill was in Tondo, the largest and most densely populated district in Manila. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) research, it is also one of the poorest districts in the nation, with living standards and poverty rates amplified by extreme population density and high costs of living.⁸ While the WHO's research focuses on healthcare access, it highlights the normalized costs and difficulties anticipated by urban centers, specifically in private companies being far more competitive in affluent urban areas than in poorer peripheral communities. Development of the Smokey Mountain community draws on two predominant factors. Foremost is the privatized concentration of land ownership in a processing system leftover from Spanish influence that delegated considerable control and power to certain families and institutions, resulting in high land and housing costs. Another contributing factor is the recent period of economic development in the Philippines; one that saw the concentration of political resources towards intense urbanization. For instance, while the agricultural sector sustains a majority of the rural Philippines, it receives far less attention; the expanding labor force is more incentivized to travel to metro centers than continue to contribute to rural agricultural sectors.⁹


Philippines National Infrastructure, Housing in the GMA

The Marcos administration was known for its excessive spending and cronyism. It was also known for its vision of a bolstered Philippine economy through extensive infrastructural

tourism within the Greater Manila Area, despite land development costs and the lack of polity made for such reform. The Marcos administration increased temporary employees and built patronage offices. It also inflated the Department of Tourism to befit an image of beautification elaborated on in the 'Edifice Complex' made famous under the Marcos administration,¹⁰ with excess money filtered into the projects by various hotel building costs under the Government Service Insurance System¹¹.

The most immediate repercussion to implementing this vision was increasing costs without means of return. High-cost government spending towards a population that could not pay taxes to offset costs, with most construction being zero-profit infrastructure that promised no return, created a skyrocketing debt crisis. Also, the growth of the Greater Manila Area far exceeded the economic capacity and labor identity of the surrounding region. This dilemma further accentuated an urban-rural divide and pushed more weight onto the urban poor, as wealth only accumulated in the entities Marcos took an interest in, namely those from his home province of Ilocos Norte. The Marcos administration's efforts to create tourism and infrastructural modernization within the GMA was responsible for the debt crisis.¹² Figure 2 is a depiction of the rapid escalation of the debt crisis during the Marcos presidency.

Figure 2: Debt Crisis Graph of the Marcos Administration



. Source: *The Rappler*

The fixation on the infrastructural development to the urban capital was marked by stagnation in spending towards rural land improvement measures. Raw goods manufacturing would have provided sustainability for those within agriculture, yet the Marcos Administration had little interest in following through with grants or economic opportunities outside of Manila. A looming debt crisis, coupled with infrastructural weakness, made many of these positions unsustainable. Thus, the GMA appeared as an option for economic activity for many who couldn't find anything remaining to support them in their rural home environments.

One driving factor of this relationship seems to be the pre-martial period of the Marcos administration and how it facilitated the appointment of a system of technocratic appointees absorbed into the political elite of the administration. This group of executive branch technocrats was highly responsible for facilitating international economic decisions and were largely American-educated. The government chose these technocrats for their capacity to open the country to foreign investments. The government gave preference to those who could facilitate more accessibility to imports rather than assisting the agricultural, export-based prowess of the

Philippines.¹³ While this environment was praised for its staunch aversion to communism in a rapid liberalization push, the National Economic Council (NEC) highlighted its nationalistic and protectionist nature related to infrastructure instability. It also became apparent that this selective process for economic leadership was also intrinsically versed in nepotistic practice. One of the most extensive voices in pre-martial Marcos power, Roberto Benedicto, was the executive secretary's longtime companion and employer, Rafael Salas, and it is widely understood that Benedicto's appointment came only through his relationship with the Secretary. This practice demonstrates the pervasive socio-cultural elements in technocratic appointments based on family and maintaining authority to a ruling, select elite.

Post-Marcos spending and infrastructure development marked an era marred by using global aid to solve the debt crisis. In October of 1983, the government declared national bankruptcy, and the World Bank's bailout required the end of government subsidies, Peso devaluation, and complete removal of tariffs. These requirements drew ire in the utilization of foreign funds into low-return infrastructural projects within the GMA. It further de-popularized the mechanism of government building projects. It facilitated an environment with enormous debt forgiveness for larger businesses that could commandeer their authority and cost growth in the capital.¹⁴ The Marcos administration decisions, namely those relating to the heightened spending, accentuated the stifled development of urban housing projects, treated with intensive scrutiny or necessitating a private partner.

These policies further facilitate an understanding of the Aquino administration's economic decisions and priorities of spending. The Marcos administration was reliant on debt renegotiation and economic diplomacy with a staunch provision to every agreement to ensure the Marcos administration's denialism and ignorance would not continue. Because of this, the credit

facility of the Philippines with the IMF needed to be entirely redrawn given the Marcos era noncompliance, rendering it null.¹⁵ This new credit facility established an environment fearful of extensive government spending but required drastic work, especially in the GMA. It continued to attract a rural migratory population to a dwindling supply of space, infrastructural development, and economic opportunities. It is this environment that facilitated the first contemporary private-public partnerships and joint venture programs. They served as staunch boundaries between private corporate interests and wealth distribution to ensure the efficiency of government projects.

In 1989, a memorandum declared by President Aquino established joint venture guidelines and capabilities with the ability for government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) to hold minority investments in private corporations. The memorandum allowed for the complete authority of the private sector to utilize funds for the project for their orientation while maintaining that government imposition and presence can only apply itself and analyze primary corporate purposes and intentions. This policy created an environment with government spending and investment reserved for “desirable economic activities” that preferred private corporate autonomy.¹⁶ In addition, this environment coupled with prior legislation and ruling gave pertinent definition to the ability to engage within a joint venture agreement without following the 1989 corporate limitations of partnership. Like the 1954 ruling, as long as the business ventures are approved within the limitations of its charter, direct registration with the SEC is not needed. When a partnership or corporation is not newly created, the agreement itself does not require additional registration. This requirement is exemplified by R-II Builder’s collaboration with the NHA already in place and given prior facilitation of infrastructure projects and work on housing within the GMA.¹⁷

What emerged from the attitudes sparked by Marcos spending to Aquino recovery is an environment desiring frugal government attention towards a growing population in the Philippines that is in most cases poor. The entirety of the Philippines is coupled with an aversion to extensive infrastructure spending that necessitated the engagement of private interests in housing. The NHA facilitated this development under Marcos in 1975, having abolished all other housing agencies. Under Aquino in 1986, with Executive order NO. 90, the NHA took over the responsibility of the Ministry of Human Settlements and exists as the sole extension of housing construction through government programs, all under the supervision of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council.¹⁸

A glimpse at pre-Marcos administration spending towards urban and rural housing divides displays a deviation in construction and material capacity. Rural municipalities saw “light material” construction between an average of 36-86% of entire housing projects, while urban cities saw a considerably lower range within 14-50%. This discrepancy is linked to the cost of construction and housing, as light materials such as palm products are traditional and linked to low maintenance costs. Many urban centers adapted to utilizing expensive, heavy materials and stylized in foreign architectural formats. Accordingly, urban centers have higher costs than the housing realities many rural Philippines populations would anticipate.¹⁹

After the establishment of the NHA, housing development continued to display a preference toward urban centers. For example, government-owned property was issued “Conditional Contract to Sell” agreements, offering housing material loans of P50,000 per family to be paid over a span of over 30 years. This agreement is distinct from the developer contracts in that they would allow the families to individually construct their own houses, with a minimum requirement of subdivision sanitation regulation. This incremental housing project is the

alternative form to the developer-constructed approach and highlights different levels of housing investment for settler populations yet is constrained mainly by limited land availability and resource waste due to a lack of structural planning.²⁰

In contrast, organizational work with private entities is tied to the utilization of joint venture agreements and private programs to receive government funding with limited supervision. Metro Manila had utilized the Local Government Code since 1991, situating responsibility and authority of urban development on a sectoral planning approach that provided land-use plans on a heavily localized level. This relationship nurtured a far more accessible option for private developers' interests and abilities. Local governments' ability to dictate land usage became crucial to understanding allocation for socialized housing sites, resulting in a lack of a centralized metropolitan planning approach. Given this devolved distribution of power, a potential lack of coordinating mechanisms means that developers have the greatest interconnectivity network on land plans between local governments rather than the central government.²¹

This is noteworthy because socialized housing becomes equitable to balanced socialized housing programs, which operationalizes them under the private sector to encourage participation, primarily through benefits such as tax exemption and qualification simplicity in acquiring necessary permits for other projects. In 1992, the same year as the development of the Smokey Mountain Housing Project, this was extended further through the Urban Development and Housing Act, which declared polity to allow for the state to cooperate with private corporations on urban development. Incentives allowed greater private corporate accessibility in housing; however, it was oriented around low-income housing exclusively, where private developers often look to invest in high-income productivity, thus requiring further incentives.²²

Housing development and restructuring elicited a discussion of resettlement, especially given a revitalized interest in land redevelopment and improvement that would disrupt the migratory urban poor, such as the populations in the slums around the Smokey Mountain location. The history of resettlement programs, especially within the urban environment, is hostile. In the 1960s, under Macapagal, a program known as the 'Balik Probinsya' evicted several hundred thousand squatter families from metropolitan areas into unmaintained resettlement zones, with approximately 36% of them returning to the Manila periphery by the end of the Marcos Administration.²³ Post-1986, these evictions continued by the Aquino Administration, which was pressured by the President's Commission on Urban Poverty to encourage Barangay level governance to assume greater authority on socialized housing and local maintenance.

However, following the Urban Development and Housing Act, the higher polity emphasized the legitimization and organization of forced evictions. These forced evictions were lobbied against primarily by Catholic interest groups and lobbied for by the Builders' Association and Chamber of Real Estate, which the general population actively opposed given the lack of controlled economic contributions they would provide.²⁴ This program instilled a three-year grace period against forced evictions and attempted to provide legal consultation and community mortgage programs for settlers to purchase land. Less than five percent of families did, resulting in local governments selling public land to private developers. These companies' primary objectives centered around working more efficiently in a program of public housing avenues that would provide them economic incentive and capacity, reflected in the Tondo Recycling Collective.

This information suggests an infrastructural dilemma that created an environment that necessitated a controlled government response towards needed public housing. Private companies satiated this demand, and their dissatisfaction with low-income development policy could have been lessened through joint venture programs working through local governance. However, with preferential opportunities to afford such housing from coming jobs with said companies, this semi-socialized housing suddenly became far more viable. An individual that worked with the private sector could find themselves possessing increased domain and freedom in relationships to the local government. Because of this, a polity on resettlement procedure, housing development, and company presence within these socialized communities became something enforceable and contractible, despite it not being often manageable for many populations.

Housing discrimination within the Philippines

Housing discrimination is typically associated with barriers based on racial makeup; discrimination based on gender, sex, and religion exists, though they often protected against to prevent housing discrimination. However, fewer protections exist for physical and mental disabilities, especially where diagnosis and treatment options are not readily available. The aspects of one's physical ability, including parenthood or elderly age, aren't considered. Barriers like this are not uncommon in housing, such as those who prohibit persons under the age of 18 on the property.²⁵

In the Philippines, housing accessibility follows the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, asserting that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,

sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”²⁶ This statement, alongside the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, asserts direct mechanisms of discrimination by identity are disallowed; so racially based quotas or limitations are explicitly banned. The Philippines’ Law on Housing documentation focuses on the covenant of economic, social, and cultural rights, discussing discriminatory eviction, planned demolitions, and action against private and public maintenance quotas by landlords over topics of rent pricing, dwelling maintenance, and other potential inhibitory factors. The Philippines’ Law of Housing, covering discriminatory eviction, would presumably provide protective capacity based on suppliant housing access, especially for such marginalized groups.²⁷

An analysis of legal enforcement of these protections reveals weakness concerning the mechanisms and channels allowing one to address discrimination cases adequately, as there is no official mechanism to lodge complaints on housing discrimination. The government advises individuals to go through active NGOs to reach the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. However, such a process requires responsibility by those NGOs, including those that may be discriminatory entities.

Additionally, this document asserts that only evictions conducted by or with the state’s approval are considered discriminatory housing. This definition becomes an issue when observing that joint venture programs (such as the Tondo project) are often made with the direct intention of minimizing government intervention and involvement in favor of allowing the private partner entity further domain over low-cost housing.²⁸ Therefore, while the program itself is government-mandated and constructed, a large proportion of the property and land was

purchased by private entities. Consequently, they would not be held accountable for discrimination in their manner of eviction or housing consideration.

Housing discrimination also includes discrimination against income capacity and wealth. The largest economic activity within the Tondo area was scavenging, which provided a sense of labor capacity with flexible participation for the physically disabled and all people regardless of age. When the Tondo location was closed and renovated for public housing, those living there shifted to working at the recycling-based co-op as a work opportunity. This is an infrastructural issue not uncommon within the GMA, where the cost of living and housing is often higher than the average salary. Such a model disproportionality leaves out members of the population living under the poverty line, as there is a 168% disparity in salary to cost of living.²⁹

In the context of the housing project, low-cost housing developments, especially those with private components, would have a lower cost disparity. However, with a financial incentive involved, measures that would harm the ability to receive income would be disapproved. One mechanism for this is the disproportionate levels of homelessness between individuals and family units. Often, a single person typically does not fall into homelessness. At the same time, families cannot afford increased costs of living due to having more mouths to feed, including children too young to contribute economically. Programs that seek to resolve housing vulnerability and homelessness within the Philippines, such as its MCCT-HSF program, note that approximately 75% of the homeless population are likely family units, either transitionally or in permanent status.³⁰

Scavenging allows the entire family unit to provide labor and produce income. Removing their only resource can make the costs too high to incur for a family unit. The Poverty and Environment Fund of the Asian Development Bank provide funding for substitutes to

scavenging, such as the materials recovery facility, which has implicitly required child labor provisions, thus removing part of the income once generated in these family units. However, loss of income continues to present problems as family incomes declined by approximately 6% between 1975 to 1981. The decade-long decline in family income was felt more heavily in rural areas, thus encouraging movement to urban centers.³¹

This analysis offers a theoretical framework behind housing discrimination that is based on the family unit, age, and physical ability as it pertains to the capacity to keep a job and afford housing. The most striking component of this is the large amount of homelessness that occurs within family units, and often in migratory patterns rather than those who have developed in communities. What this insinuates is that the population statistics of the projects applied for housing, and how they may shift from individual housing to family housing, influence trends in low-cost housing projects and socialized community building. These trends are also influenced by how much of a residency is populated by single individuals in comparison to family units, compared to the barangay's former homeless population or squatter population that was displaced by the same developments. If there is a higher proportion of single individuals, it means that preferential status is placed upon these individuals, so that they have greater access to housing opportunities. As displayed in Figure 3, the most common household within Manila is that of single individuals, rather than married, or divorced couples, which would typically also have children to account for.³²

Figure 3: Household Population Statistics by Marital Status

Table 3. Household Population 10 Years Old and Over by Marital Status and Sex: Manila, 2007

Marital Status	Both Sexes	Male	Female
Total	1,315,416	637,147	678,269
Single	607,389	308,746	298,643
Married	516,120	255,784	260,336
Widowed	57,196	10,776	46,420
Divorced/Separated	29,578	9,984	19,594
Common Law/Live-in	100,570	49,763	50,807
Unknown	4,563	2,094	2,469

Source: National Statistics Office, 2007 Census of Population

Tondo & The Payatas

When assessing these regionally observed issues, observation comes primarily from census data collection. This information is limited, but still provides useful statistics on the size of households within separate sectors of the greater Manila area. We look at statistics from 1995 that offer a glimpse of population concentration per area.³³ The National Capital Region (NCR) in total displayed an average of five persons per household beginning in 1990, which decreased to an average of 4.7 persons per household by 1995, despite population growth of 3.3% during the same time. In 1995, Tondo had a total population of 589,644, a recorded household population of 589,273, and 121,438 households. This equated to a 4.86 person-per-household record, higher than the regional average. In comparison, Quezon City, which hosts the Payatas, had a population household average of 4.75 persons per household, also higher than the regional average. For clarification, this means that in the year before the Smokey Mountain Site was officially closed, both areas held higher person-per-household averages than the regional average.

However, post 1995, both household number and household size decreased marginally, with the regional average for both Tondo and the Payatas declining to approximately 4.71 persons per household.³⁴ These values describe the amount of family units in Manila, as opposed

to those without children to account for as a factor of their livelihood and productivity. This shrink in total housing opportunities despite population growth is indicative of a population that is either no longer able to live in their homes or are moving in with others, thus causing the observed increase in average number of persons per household in the Manila region. This is most likely to occur to families, given they often exist on the poorer end of economic capacity and activity.

Tondo itself holds some of the poorest populations in all of Manila within its slums, with squatter populations almost entirely working temporary jobs that earned less income than average consumption expenditures, typically in a monthly disparity of P371 earned versus P392 in expenditures. Tondo was the largest squatter area in the entirety of Southeast Asia, had a population of 157,860 in 1974, with an average of two full households living in each singular unit.³⁵ The Tondo Foreshore Housing Development Project, which specifically targeted the dumpsite of Smokey Mountain, was entirely government based, taking 137 hectares to create subsidized land for 15,000 housing units with a 25-year exemption on housing payments, credit extensions, and communal facilities. The belief for the program was that with greater community participation and access to funded government education programs, labor could become more skilled, and thus increase average income within the area as well as help people build up savings. This project did provide relief in a socio-economic sense, and income increasing proportionally to school and income levels for those who were able to increase their skilled labor potential. Figure 4 displays data gathered after the project was in effect, which shows statistical support for the success of the project.³⁶

Figure 4: Tondo Foreshore Education and Community Issue Table

Table 2: Difference of Proportions (t-ratios) of Variables for Tondo Foreshore in 1974 and in 1984

Variables	1974 (N=2643)	1984 (N=181)	t-ratio ¹
Residents who save	.380	.580	5.26**
Education:			
Population enrolled in elementary school	.185	.514	10.28**
Population enrolled in high school	.069	.498	18.65**
Schooling members who go to high school after elementary school	.375	.968	15.60**
Perceived Community Problems:			
Basic facilities	.200	.144	1.81
Physical infrastructure	.270	.110	4.71**
Physical environment	.230	.440	6.36**
Social infrastructure	.170	.110	2.07*
Landownership	.146	.006	5.18**
Economic problems	.461	.625	4.20**
Peace and order; Social relationships	.053	.309	12.80**
No problem stated	.025	.039	1.17

*p < .05
**p < .001

¹ df = 2822

Source: *Philippine Sociological Review*

The results of issues mentioned in the data suggest that the population that remained found improvement in their situation, following the increase in education and skilled labor. Thus, the success of the Tondo Project encouraged other projects to grow, especially within the private sector. However, important to note is the smaller sample of responses in the data from 1984, which is a direct result of a portion of the population accepting the opportunities of the housing units and new economic environment as opposed to the population that remained in scavenging. However, there remains a disproportionality between available households and the population that needs them, as 15,000 sustainable housing units is simply not enough for the environment and population, and as a result, a large portion of society could not readily afford the newly

available housing. The immediate costs of consumption also became a concern when their housing was far from the scavenging sites they received immediate income from.

Furthermore, a large amount of the scavenging population are the rural poor that are unaccustomed to the urban environment, and as such, are often too old to regularly participate in educational programs, especially pressured by both uneven economic development levels and increasing land values.³⁷ Tondo itself fell victim to this with the slum populations that lived off the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite, as even with its official closure, the population that remained refused to leave their environment because the dumpsite offered the assurance of long-term economic payoff that expensive and selective housing opportunities could not. This is disproportionately affecting the physically disabled, family units, and the elderly, groups which are commonly found in slums at higher rates than other groups. In addition, the new housing presented more barriers with its infrastructural regulation on household size, while there was a lack of regulatory concerns in slum-based housing in Tondo, allowing for larger family units to exist in a single location.

According to surveys compiled by the Department of Social Welfare and Development in 1988, population density consisted of 463 persons per hectares in the slums, compared to the Metro Manila population density of 93 persons per hectare, with structure overcrowding less of a concern with sustainable housing options.³⁸ This demonstrates the boundaries of housing accessibility; when these sites are taken and renovated, the amount of people displaced did not equate to the amount of housing units provided; as such, households that were smaller, or less reliant on the economic benefits of scavenging, were more often those who were able to access such houses. What this also asserts is that in the process of allocating housing space for people, it

is likely that regulatory officials would look for those that would prefer rehousing because of their own social obligations and requirements.

Tondo was heavily impacted by Marcos-era policies and funding that placed its focus on massive resettlement programs, primarily assisted by funding from the World Bank, despite multiple assertions that they were actually focused on the development of slums.³⁹ Resettlement was oriented, at least in successful instances, as large-scale infrastructure projects to ensure that marginalized workers would be kept away from urban real estate opportunities, which would upset short-term focused actors. However, the Tondo Dumpsite was not considered to be a real estate opportunity by the time of the Marcos Administration. Instead, it seems that the population was forced to move simply to improve Tondo's image considering that in the post-Marcos administration, no infrastructure project had taken up space in the area over the dumpsite.

In addition, there was a perception that the high costs of homeownership were part of a coercive process because there were limits on household dispersion, and a lack of immediate localized economic opportunity. Families often rejected the offers of the NHA and were then told to move back to rural areas or were told to meet with a government housing official.⁴⁰ The population was averse to this given their immediate socio-cultural belongings and economic status, and this 'compromise' created skepticism in a population given new housing reform programs. Without reassurance or outreach, it seems populations were likely to refuse housing that directly threatened scavenging economic opportunities, thus exacerbating motivations to move to the Payatas Dumpsite.

An indicator of the movement of families disproportionate to single people to the Payatas dumpsite post Tondo-Closure is demonstrated by the significant proportion of children within the Barangay specifically, as analyzed by the enforcement of the State of the Children report and

Child Friendly Cities research project.⁴¹ This research insinuated that more than fifty percent of the population of the Barangay are children, and that a large population living in the disposal areas of the district is predominantly identifiable as youth. What this means is that many of those people in the area belong to larger family units. Considering that many programs are focused on school building and day care centers, we can also deduce that many of these youths have not received much education, insinuating that these are not the same populations that would be privy to educational access within the Tondo site.

Proactive scavenging groups presented a unified front within the Payatas region, monikered as the Payatas Scavenger's Association and connected to the Lupang Pangako Urban Poor Association, both of which work and advocate for the improvement of the dumpsite itself rather than resettlement, given their emphasis on the position being a viable economic opportunity for many.⁴² It therefore seems that these organizations are made specifically with the intention of preventing eviction and relocation as a reactionary measure, asserting that many have been impacted by these repercussions and are connected to the direct population shifts flowing from the closed Smokey Mountain location.

Conclusion

This research provides insight into the impacts of scavenging and settler populations in both the Tondo and Payatas areas, displaying the discriminatory mentalities that were prevalent, installed, and expected within Tondo as well as the current socio-cultural standards exhibited within the Payatas to tie them to one another as a dissuading process. As a result of the inability of housing projects to benefit larger households, coercive fear of the removal of the household the high amount of children seen in the Payatas region, and heavily anti-relocation or rehousing projects, there exists an observable connection to the habits of movement towards the Payatas

dumpsite being overwhelmingly made up of families and young children. This raises questions about the true ability and intentions of the Smokey Mountain Housing Project to adequately assist these populations and calls into question the veracity of R-II Builders in assisting these populations.

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